Algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities occur when the worst-case time/space complexity of an application is signi cantly higher than the respective average case for particular user-controlled inputs. When such conditions are met, an attacker can launch Denial-ofService attacks against a vulnerable application by providing inputs that trigger the worst-case behavior.
Service attacks against a vulnerable application by providing inputs that trigger the worst-case behavior. Such attacks have been known to have serious e ects on production systems, take down entire websites, or lead to bypasses of Web Application Firewalls.
Unfortunately, existing detection mechanisms for algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities are domain-speci c and often require signi cant manual e ort. In this paper, we design, implement, and evaluate S F , a domain-independent framework for automatically nding algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities. S F automatically nds inputs that trigger worst-case algorithmic behavior in the tested binary. S F uses resource-usage-guided evolutionary search techniques to automatically nd inputs that maximize computational resource utilization for a given application.
We demonstrate that S F successfully generates inputs that match the theoretical worst-case performance for several wellknown algorithms. S F was also able to generate a large number of inputs that trigger di erent algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities in real-world applications, including various zip parsers used in antivirus software, regular expression libraries used in Web Application Firewalls, as well as hash table implementations used in Web applications. In particular, S F generated inputs that achieve 300-times slowdown in the decompression routine of the bzip2 utility, discovered regular expressions that exhibit matching times exponential in the input size, and also managed to automatically produce inputs that trigger a high number of collisions in PHP's default hashtable implementation.
INTRODUCTION
Algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities result from large di erences between the worst-case and average-case time/space complexities Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or a liate of the United States government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only. CCS'17, Oct. 30-Nov. 3, 2017, Dallas, TX, USA. of algorithms or data structures used by a ected software [31] . An attacker can exploit such vulnerabilities by providing specially crafted inputs that trigger the worst-case behavior in the victim software to launch Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. For example, regular expression matching is known to exhibit widely varying levels of time complexity (from linear to exponential) on input string size depending on the type of the regular expression and underlying implementation details. Similarly, the run times of hash table insertion and lookup operations can di er signi cantly if the hashtable implementation su ers from a large number of hash collisions. Sorting algorithms like quicksort can have an O (nlo n) average-case complexity but an O (n 2 ) worst-case complexity. Such worst-case behaviors have been known to take down entire websites [22] , disable/bypass Web Application Firewalls (WAF) [6] , or to keep thousands of CPUs busy by merely performing hash-table insertions [19, 24] .
Despite their potential severity, in practice, detecting algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities in a domain-independent way is a hard, multi-faceted problem. It is often infeasible to completely abandon algorithms or data structures with high worst-case complexities without severely restricting the functionality or backwardscompatibility of an application. Manual time complexity analysis of real-world applications is hard to scale. Moreover, asymptotic complexity analysis ignores the constant factors that can signicantly a ect the application execution time despite not impacting the overall complexity class. All these factors signi cantly harden the detection of algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities.
Even when real-world applications use well-understood algorithms, time complexity analysis is still non-trivial for the following reasons. First, the time/space complexity analysis changes significantly even with minor implementation variations (for instance, the choice of the pivot in the quicksort algorithm drastically affects its worst-case runtime behavior [30] ). Reasoning about the e ects of such changes requires signi cant manual e ort. Second, most real-world applications often have multiple inter-connected components that interact in complex ways. This interconnection further complicates the estimation of the overall complexity, even when the time complexity of the individual components is well understood.
Most existing detection mechanisms for algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities use domain-and implementation-speci c heuristics or rules, e.g., detect excessive backtracking during regular expression matching [5, 25] . However, such rules tend to be brittle and are hard to scale to a large number of diverse domains, since their creation and maintenance requires signi cant manual e ort and expertise. Moreover, keeping such rules up-to-date with newer software versions is onerous, as even minor changes to the implementation might require signi cant changes in the rules.
In this work, we design, implement, and evaluate a novel dynamic domain-independent approach for automatically nding inputs that trigger worst-case algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities in tested applications. In particular, we introduce S F , an evolutionary-search-based framework that can automatically nd inputs to maximize resource utilization (instruction count, memory usage etc.) for a given test binary. S F is fully automated and does not require any manual guidance or domain-speci c rules. The key idea behind S F is that the problem of nding algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities can be posed as an optimization problem whose goal is to nd an input that maximizes resource utilization of a target application. We develop an evolutionary search technique speci cally designed to nd solutions for this optimization problem.
We evaluate S F on a variety of real world applications, including the PCRE library for regular expression matching [18] , the bzip2 compression/decompression utility, as well as the hash table implementation of PHP. We demonstrate that S F can successfully generate inputs that trigger complexity vulnerabilities in all the above contexts. Particularly, we show that S F generates inputs that achieve a 300-times slowdown when decompressed by the bzip2 utility, can produce regular expressions that exhibit matching times exponential in the input's size, and also manages to automatically generate inputs that trigger a high number of collisions in real-world PHP applications. We also demonstrate that our evolutionary guidance scheme achieves more than 100% improvement over code coverage at steering input generation towards triggering complexity vulnerabilities.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We present S F , the rst, to the best of our knowledge, domain-independent dynamic testing tool for automatically nding algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities without any manual guidance.
• We design an evolutionary guidance engine with novel mutation schemes particularly tted towards generating inputs that trigger worst-case resource usage behaviors in a given application. Our scheme achieves more than 100% improvement over code-coverage-guided input generation at nding such inputs.
• We evaluate S F on a variety of complex real-world applications and demonstrate its e cacy at detecting complexity vulnerabilities in diverse domains including large real-world software like the bzip2 utility and the PCRE regular expression library.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a highlevel overview of S F 's inner workings with a motivating example in Section 2. We describe the details of our methodology in Section 3. The implementation of S F is described in Section 4 and the evaluation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 outlines the limitations of our current prototype and discusses possible future extensions. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
OVERVIEW 2.1 Problem Description
In this paper, we detect algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities in a given application by detecting inputs that cause large variations in resource utilization through the number of executed instructions or CPU usage for all inputs of a given size. We assume that our tool has gray-box access to the application binary, i.e., it can instrument the binary in order to harvest di erent ne-grained resource usage information from multiple runs of the binary, with di erent inputs. Note that our goal is not to estimate the asymptotic complexities of the underlying algorithms or data structures of the application. Instead, we measure the resource usage variation in some prede ned metric like the total edges accessed during a run, and try to maximize that metric. Even though, in most cases, the inputs causing worst-case behaviors under such metrics will be the ones demonstrating the actual worst-case asymptotic behaviors, but this may not always be true due to the constant factors ignored in the asymptotic time complexity, the small input sizes, etc. Threat model. Our threat model assumes that an attacker can provide arbitrary specially-crafted inputs to the vulnerable software to trigger worst-case behaviors. This is a very realistic threat-model as most non-trivial real-world software like Web applications and regular expression matchers need to deal with inputs from untrusted sources. For a subset of our experiments involving regular expression matching, we assume that attackers can control regular expressions provided to the matchers. This is a valid assumption for a large set of applications that provide search functionality through custom regular expressions from untrusted users.
A Motivating Example
In order to understand how our technique works, let us consider quicksort, one of the simplest yet most widely used sorting algorithms. It is well-known [30] that quicksort has an average time complexity of O (nlo n) but a worst-case complexity of O (n 2 ) where n is the size of the input. However, nding an actual input that demonstrates the worst-case behavior in a particular quicksort implementation depends on low-level details like the pivot selection mechanism. If an adversary knows the actual pivot selection scheme used by the implementation, she can use domain-speci c rules to nd an input that will trigger the worst-case behavior (e.g., the quadratic time complexity) [40] .
However, in our setting, S F does not know any domainspeci c rules. It also does not understand the semantics of pivot selection or which part of the code implements the pivot selection logic, even though it has access to the quicksort implementation. We would still like S F to generate inputs that trigger the corresponding worst-case behavior and identify the algorithmic complexity vulnerability.
This brings us to the following research question: how can S F automatically generate inputs that would trigger worst-case performance in a tested binary in a domain-independent manner? The search space of all inputs is too large to search exhaustively. Our key intuition in this paper is that evolutionary search techniques can be used to iteratively nd inputs that are closer to triggering the worst-case behavior. Adopting an evolutionary testing approach, S F begins with a corpus of seed inputs, applies mutations to each of the inputs in the corpus, and ranks each of the inputs based on their resource usage patterns. S F keeps the highest ranked inputs for further mutations in upcoming generations.
To further illustrate this point, let us consider the pseudocode of Figure 1 , depicting a quicksort example with a simple pivot selection scheme-the rst element of the array being selected as the pivot. In this case, the worst-case behavior can be elicited by an already sorted array. Let us also assume that S F 's initial corpus consists of some arrays of numbers and that none of them are completely sorted. Executing this quicksort implementation with the seed arrays will result in a di erent number of statements/instructions executed based on how close each of these arrays are to being sorted. S F will assign a score to each of these inputs based on the number of statements executed by the quicksort implementation for each of the inputs. The inputs resulting in the highest number of executed statements will be selected for further mutation to create the next generation of inputs. Therefore, each upcoming generation will have inputs that are closer to being completely sorted than the inputs of the previous generations.
For example, let us assume the initial corpus for S F consists of a single array I = [8, 5, 3, 7, 9] . At each step, S F picks at random an input from the corpus, mutates it, and passes the mutated input to the above quicksort implementation while recording the number of executed statements. As shown in Figure 1 , the input [8, 5, 3, 7, 9] results in the execution of 37 lines of code (LOC). Let us assume that this input is mutated into [1, 5, 3, 7, 9 ] that causes the execution of 52 LOC which is higher than the original input and therefore [1, 5, 3, 7, 9 ] is selected for further mutation. Eventually, S F will nd a completely sorted array (e.g., [1, 5, 6, 7, 9] as shown in Figure 1 ) that will demonstrate the worstcase quadratic behavior. We provide a more thorough analysis of S F 's performance on various sorting implementations in Section 5.2.
METHODOLOGY
The key observation for our methodology is that evolutionary search techniques together with dynamic analysis present a promising approach for nding inputs that demonstrate worst-case complexity of a test application in a domain-independent way. However, to enable S F to e ciently nd such inputs, we need to carefully design e ective guidance mechanisms and mutation schemes to drive S F 's input generation process. We design a new evolutionary algorithm with customized guidance mechanisms and mutation schemes that are tailored for nding inputs causing worstcase behavior.
Algorithm 1 shows the core evolutionary engine of S F . Initially, S F randomly selects an input to execute from a given seed corpus (line 4), which is mutated (line 5) and passed as input to the test application (line 6). During an execution, pro ling info such as the di erent types of resource usage of the application are recorded (lines 6-8). An input is scored based on its resource usage and is added to the mutation corpus if the input is deemed as a slow unit (lines 9-12). app_insn, app_outputs = R (A, mut_input)
7:
en_insn ∪ = {app_insn} 8: en_usa e ∪ = {app_usa e} 9:
if S U ( en_insn, en_usa e, GlobalState) then return units 16: end procedure
In the following Sections, we describe the core components of S F 's engine, particularly the tness function used to determine whether an input is a slow unit or not, and the o set and type of mutations performed on each of the individual inputs in the corpus. 
Fitness Functions
As shown in Algorithm 1, S F determines, after each execution, whether the executed unit should be considered for further mutations (lines 9-12). S F ranks the current inputs based on the scores assigned to them by a tness function and keeps the ttest ones for further mutation. Popular coverage-based tness functions which are often used by evolutionary fuzzers to detect crashes, are not well suited for our purpose as they do not consider loop iterations which are crucial for detecting worst-case time complexity. S F 's input generation is guided by a tness function based on resource usage. Such a tness function is generic and can take into consideration di erent kinds of resource usage like CPU usage, energy, memory, etc. In order to measure the CPU usage in a ne-grained way, S F 's tness function keeps track of the total count of all instructions executed during a run of a test program. The intuition is that the test program becomes slower as the number of executed instructions increases. Therefore, the tness function selects the inputs that result in the highest number of executed instructions as the slowest units. For e ciency, we monitor execution at the basic-block level instead of instructions while counting the total number of executed instructions for a program. We found that this method is more e ective at guiding input generation than directly using the time taken by the test program to run. The runtime of a program shows large variations, depending on the application's concurrency characteristics or other programs that are executing in the same CPU, and therefore is not a reliable indicator for small increases in CPU usage.
Mutation Strategy
S F introduces several new mutation strategies tailored to identify inputs that demonstrate the worst-case complexity of a program. A mutation strategy decides which mutation operations to apply and which byte o sets in an input to modify, to generate a new mutated input (Algorithm 1, line 5). S F supports the following mutation operations: (i) add/remove a new/existing byte from the input; ii) randomly modify a bit/byte in the input; iii) randomly change the order of a subset of the input bytes; iv) randomly change bytes whose values are within the range of ASCII codes for digits (i.e., 0x30-0x39); v) perform a crossover operation in a given bu er mixing di erent parts of the input; and vi) mutate bytes solely using characters or strings from a user-provided dictionary.
We describe the di erent mutation strategies supported by S F below. Section 5.6 presents a detailed performance comparison of these strategies. Random Mutations. Random mutations are the simplest mutation strategy supported by S F . Under this mutation strategy, one of the aforementioned mutations is selected at random and is applied on an input, as long as it does not violate other constraints for the given testing session, such as exceeding the maximum input length speci ed by the auditor. This strategy is similar to the ones used by popular evolutionary fuzzers like AFL [58] and libFuzzer [14] for nding crashes or memory safety issues.
Mutation priority. Under this strategy, the mutation operation is selected with ϵ probability based on its success at producing slow units during previous executions. The mutation operation is picked at random with (1 − ϵ ) probability. In contrast, the mutation o set is still selected at random just like the strategy described above.
In particular, during testing, we count all the cases in which a mutation operation resulted in an increase in the observed instruction count and the number of times that operation has been selected. Based on these values, we assign a score to each mutation operation denoting the probability of the mutation to be successful at increasing the instruction count. For example, a score of 0 denotes that the mutation operation has never resulted in an increase in the number of executed instructions, whereas a score of 1 denotes that the mutation always resulted in an increase.
We pick the highest-scoring mutation among all mutation operations with a probability ϵ. The tunable parameter ϵ determines how often a mutation operation will be selected at random versus based on its score. Essentially, di erent values of ϵ provide di erent trade-o s between exploration and exploitation. In S F , we set the default value of ϵ to 0.5.
O set priority. This strategy selects the mutation operation to be applied randomly at each step, but the o set to be mutated is selected based on prior history of success at increasing the number of executed instructions. The mutation o set is selected based on the results of previous executions with a probability ϵ and at random with a probability (1 − ϵ ). In the rst case, we select the o set that showed the most promise based on previous executions (each o set is given a score ranging from 0 to 1 denoting the percentage of times in which the mutation of that o set led to an increase in the number of instructions).
Hybrid. In this last mode of operation we apply a combination of both mutation and o set priority as described above. For each o set, we maintain an array of probabilities of success for each of the mutation operations that are being performed. Instead of maintaining a coarse-grained success probability for each mutation in the mutation priority strategy, we maintain ne-grained success probabilities for each o set/mutation operation pairs. We compute the score of each o set by computing the average of success probabilities of all mutation operations at that o set. During each mutation, with a probability of ϵ, we pick the o set and operation with the highest scores. The mutation o set and operation are also picked randomly with a probability of (1 − ϵ ).
IMPLEMENTATION
The S F prototype is built on top of libFuzzer [14], a popular evolutionary fuzzer for nding crash and memory safety bugs. We outline the implementation details of di erent components of S F below. Overall, our modi cations to libFuzzer consist of 550 lines of C++ code. We used Clang v4.0 for compiling our modi cations along with the rest of libFuzzer code. Figure 2 shows S F 's high-level architecture. Similar to the popular evolutionary fuzzers like AFL [58] inputs to be passed into the tested applications and re nes the corpus during execution based on S F 's tness function. For each generation, an input is selected, mutated, then passed into the main routine of the application for its execution.
Instrumentation. Similar to libFuzzer, S F 's instrumentation is based on Clang's SanitizerCoverage [21] passes. Particularly, SanitizerCoverage allows tracking of each executed function, basic block, and edge in the Control Flow Graph (CFG). It also allows us to register callbacks for each of these events. S F makes use of SanitizerCoverage's eight bit counter capability that maps each Control Flow Graph (CFG) edge into an eight bit counter representing the number of times that edge was accessed during an execution. We use the counter to keep track of the following ranges: 1, 2, 3, 4-7, 8-15, 16-31, 32-127, 128+. This provides a balance between accuracy of the counts and the overhead incurred for maintaining them. This information is then passed into S F 's tness function, which determines whether an input is slow enough to keep for the next generation of mutations. Mutations. LibFuzzer provides API support for custom input mutations. However, in order to implement the mutation strategies proposed in Section 3.2, we had to modify libFuzzer internals. Particularly, we augment the functions used in libFuzzer's Mutator class to return information on the mutation operation, o set, and the range of a ected bytes for each new input generated by LibFuzzer. This information is used to compute the scores necessary for supporting mutation piority, o set priority, and hybrid modes as described in Section 3.2 without any additional runtime overhead.
EVALUATION
In this Section, we evaluate S F on the following objectives: a) Is S F capable of generating inputs that match the theoretical worst-case complexity for a given algorithm's implementation? b) Is S F capable of e ciently nding inputs that cause performance slowdowns in real-world applications? c) How do the di erent mutation and guidance engines of S F a ect its performance? d) How does S F compare with codecoverage-guided search at nding inputs demonstrating worst-case application behavior?
We describe the detailed results of our evaluation in the following Sections. All our experiments were performed on a machine with 23GB of RAM, equipped with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X5550 @ 2.67GHz and running 64-bit Debian 8 (jessie), compiled with GCC version 4.9.2, with a kernel version 4.5.0. All binaries were compiled using the Clang-4.0 compiler toolchain. All instruction counts and execution times are measured using the Linux perf pro ler v3.16, averaging over 10 repetitions for each perf execution.
Overview
In order to adequately address the questions outlined in the previous Section, we execute S F on applications of di erent algorithmic pro les and evaluate its ability of generating inputs that demonstrate worst case behavior.
First, we examine if S F generates inputs that demonstrate the theoretical worst-case behavior of well-known algorithms. We apply S F on sorting algorithms with well-known complexities. The results are presented in Section 5.2. Subsequently, we apply S F on di erent applications and algorithms that have been known to be vulnerable to complexity attacks: the PCRE regular expression library, the default hash table implementation of PHP, and the bzip2 binary. In all cases, we demonstrate that S F is able to trigger complexity vulnerabilities. Table 1 shows a summary of our ndings.
Tested Application Fuzzing Outcome
Insertion sort [30] 41.59x slowdown Quicksort (Fig 1) 5 As shown in Table 1 , S F is successful at inducing signicant slowdown on all tested applications. Moreover, when applied to the PCRE library, it managed to generate regular expressions that exhibit exponential and super-linear (worse than quadratic) matching automatically, without any knowledge of the structure of a regular expression. Likewise, it successfully generated inputs that induce a high number of collisions when inserted into a PHP hash table, without any notion of hash functions. In the following Sections, we provide details on each of the above test settings.
Sorting
Simple quicksort and insertion sort. Our rst evaluation of S F 's consistency with theoretical results is performed on common sorting algorithms with well-known worst-performing inputs. To this end, we initially apply S F on an implementation of the insertion sort algorithm [30], as well as on an implementation of quicksort [30] in which the rst sub-array element is always selected as the pivot. Both of the above implementations demonstrate quadratic complexity when the input passed to them is sorted. We run S F for 1 million generations on the above
implementations, sorting a le with a size of 64 bytes, and examine the slowdown S F introduced over the fastest unit seen during testing. To do so, we count the total instructions executed by each program for each of the inputs, subtracting all instructions not relevant to the quicksort functionality (e.g., loader code). Our results are presented in Figure 3 . Figure 3: Best slowdown achieved by S F at each generation (normalized over the slowdown of the bestperforming input) versus best random testing outcome, on our insertion sort and quicksort drivers, for an input size of 64 bytes (average of 100 runs). The S F achieves slowdowns of 84.97% and 83.74% compared to the theoretical worst cases for insertion sort and quicksort respectively. Figure 3 represents an average of 100 runs. In each run, S F started execution with a single random 64 byte seed, and executed for 1 million generations. We notice that S F achieves 41.59x and 5.12x slowdowns for insertion sort and quicksort respectively. In order to examine how this behavior compares to random testing, we randomly generated 1 million inputs of 64 bytes each and measured the instructions required for insertion sort and quicksort, respectively. Figure 3 depicts the maximum slowdown achieved through random testing across all runs. We notice that in both cases S F outperforms the brute-force worst-input estimation. Finally, we observe that the gap between brute-force search and S F is much higher for quicksort than insertion, which is consistent with the fact that average case complexity of insertion sort is O (n 2 ), compared to quicksort's O (nlo n). Therefore, a random input is more likely to demonstrate worst-case behavior for insertion sort but not for quicksort. Real-world quicksort implementations. We also examined how S F performs when applied to real-world quicksort implementations. Particularly, we applied it to the Apple [12], GNU [9], NetBSD [15] , and OpenBSD [13] quicksort implementations. We notice that S F 's performance on real world implementations is consistent with the quicksort performance that we observed in the experiments described above. In particular, the slowdowns generated by S F were (in increasing order) 8.7%, for theNetBSD implementation, 26.36% for the GNU quicksort implementation, 3.30x for the OpenBSD implementation and 3.34x for the Apple implementation. We notice that, despite the fact these implementations use e cient pivot selection strategies, S F still manages to trigger signi cant slowdowns. On the contrary, repeating the same experiment using naive coverage-based fuzzing yields slowdowns that never surpass 5% for any of the libraries. This is an expected result, as coverage-based fuzzers are geared towards maximizing coverage, and thus do not favor inputs exercising the same edges repeatedly over inputs that discover new edges.
Finally, we note that, similar to the experiment of Figure 3 , the slowdowns for Figure 4 are also measured in terms of executed instructions, normalized over the instructions of the best performing input seen during testing. Result 1: S F was able to generate inputs for quicksort and insertion sort that achieve 83.74% and 84.97% of the theoretical worst-case, respectively without any information on the algorithm internals.
Regular Expressions
Regular expression implementations are known to be susceptible to complexity attacks [17, 20, 24] . In particular, there are over 150 Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerabilities registered in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), which are the result of exponential (e.g., [8] ) or super-linear (worse than quadratic) e.g., [7] complexity of regular expression matching by several existing matchers [57] .
Even performing domain-speci c analyses of whether an application is susceptible to ReDoS attacks is non-trivial. Several works are solely dedicated to the detection of exploitation of such vulnerabilities. Recently, Rexploiter [57] presented algorithms to detect whether a given regular expression may result in non-deterministic nite automata (NFA) that require super-linear or exponential matching times for specially crafted inputs. They have also presented domain-speci c algorithms to generate inputs capable of triggering such worst-case performance. The above denote the hardness of S F 's task, namely nding regular expressions that may result in super-linear or exponential matching times without any domain knowledge. Figure 5: Probability of S F nding at least n unique instances of regexes that cause a slowdown, or exhibit superlinear and exponential matching times, after 1 million generations (inverse CDF over 100 runs).
For the regular expression setting we perform two separate experiments to check whether S F can produce i) regular expressions which exhibit super-linear and exponential matching times, ii) inputs that cause slowdown during matching, given a xed regular expression. To this end, we apply S F on the PCRE regular expression library [18] and provide it with a character set of the symbols used in PCRE-compliant regular expressions (in the form of a dictionary). Notice that we do not further guide S F with respect to what mutations should be done and S F 's engine is completely agnostic of the structure of a valid regular expression. In all cases, we start testing from an empty corpus without providing any seeds of regular expressions to S F . Fixed string and mutated regular expressions. For the rst part of our evaluation, we apply S F on a binary that utilizes the PCRE library to perform regular expression matching and we let S F mutate the regular expression part of the pcre2_match call used for the matching, using a dictionary of regular expression characters. The input to be matched against the regular expression is selected from a random pool of characters and S F executes for a total of 1 million generations, or until a time-out is hit. The regular expressions generated by S F are kept limited to 10 characters or less. Once a S F session ends, we evaluate the time complexity of the generated regular expressions utilizing Rexploiter [57] , which detects if the regular expression is super-linear, exponential, or none of the two. We repeat the above process for a total of 100 fuzzing sessions.
Overall, S F generates a total of 33343 regular expressions during the above 100 sessions, out of which 27142 are rejected as invalid whereas 6201 are valid regular expressions that caused a slowdown. Out of the valid regular expressions, 765 are superlinear and 78 are exponential. This experiment demonstrates that despite being agnostic of the semantics of regex matching, S F successfully generates regexes requiring super-linear and exponential matching times. Six such examples are presented in Table 2 .
Super-linear (greater than quadratic) Exponential c*ca*b*a*b (b+)+c a+b+b+b+a+ c*(b+b)+c c*c+ccbc+ a(a|a*)+a Table 2 : Sample regexes generated by S F resulting in super-linear (greater than quadratic) and exponential matching complexity.
A detailed case study. The regexes presented in Table 2 are typical examples of regular expressions that require non-linear matching running times. This happens due to the existence of di erent paths in the respective NFAs, which reach the same state through an identical sequence of labels. Such paths have a devastating e ect during backtracking [57] . To further elaborate on this property, let us consider the NFA depicted in Figure 6 , which corresponds to the regular expression (b+)+c of Table 2 . : NFA for the regular expression (b+)+c su ering from exponential matching complexity as found by S F . q 0 is the entry state, q 2 the accept state, and q 1 the pivot state for the exponential backtracking.
We notice that, for the NFA shown in Figure 6 , starting from state q 1 , it is possible to reach q 1 again, through two di erent paths, namely the paths
Moreover, we notice that the labels in the transitions for both of the above paths are the same: 'bb' is consumed in both cases. Thus, as it is possible to reach q 2 from q 1 (via label c) as well as reach q 1 from the initial state q 0 , there will be an exponentially large number of paths to consider in the case of backtracking. Similar issues arise with loops appearing in NFAs with super-linear matching [57] .
As mentioned above, on average, among the valid regular expressions generated by S F , approximately 12.33% of the regexes have super-linear matching complexity, whereas 2.29% on average have exponential matching complexity. The aforementioned results are aggregates across all the 100 executions of the experiment. In order to estimate the probability of S F to generate a regex that exhibits a slowdown 1 , or super-linear and exponential matching times in a single session, we calculate the respective inverse CDF which is shown in Figure 5 . We notice that, for all the regular expressions observed, S F successfully generates inputs that incur a slowdown during matching. In particular, with 90% probability, S F generates at least 2 regular expressions requiring super-linear matching time and at least 31 regular expressions that cause a slowdown. S F generates at least one regex requiring exponential matching time with a probability of 45.45% . Fixed regular expression and mutated string. In the second part of our evaluation of S F on regular expressions, we seek to examine if, for a given xed regular expression, S F is able to generate inputs that can introduce a slowdown during matching. We collect PCRE-compliant regular expressions from popular Web Application Firewalls (WAF) [2] , and utilized the PCRE library to match input strings generated by S F against each regular expression. For this experiment, we apply S F on a total of 25 regular expressions, and we record the total instructions executed by the PCRE library when matching the regular expression against S F 's generated units, at each generation. For our set of regular expressions, S F achieved monotonically increasing slowdowns, ranging from 8% to 25%. Figure 7 presents how the slowdown varies as fuzzing progresses, for three representative regex samples with di erent slowdown patterns. Best slowdown achieved by S F -generated input strings (normalized over the slowdown of the bestperforming input), when matching against xed regular expressions used in WAFs (normalized against best performing input over an average of 100 runs). The corresponding regexes are listed in Appendix A.
Hash Tables
Hash tables are a core data structure in a wide variety of software. The performance of hash table lookup and insertion operations 1 Notice that due to S F 's guidance engine, any regex produced must exhibit increased instruction count as compared to all previous regexes. signi cantly a ects the overall application performance. Complexity attacks against hash table implementations may induce unwanted e ects ranging from performance slowdowns to full-edged DoS [8, 17, 19, 20, 24] . In order to evaluate if S F can generate inputs that trigger collisions without knowing any details about the underlying hash functions, we apply it on the hash table implementation of PHP (v5.6.26), which is known to be vulnerable to collision attacks. PHP Hashtables. Hashtables are prevalent in PHP and they also serve as the backbone for PHP's array interface. PHP v5.x utilizes the DJBX33A hash function for hashing using string keys, which can bee seen in Listing 1.
We notice that for two strings of the form 'ab' and 'cd' to collide, the following property must hold [10] :
It is also easy to show that if two equal-length strings A and B collide, then strings xAy, xBy where x and y are any pre x and su x respectively, also collide. Using the above property, one can construct a worst-case performing sequence of inputs [3] , forcing a worst-case insertion time of O (n 2 ). Abusing the complexity characteristics of the BJBX33A hash, attackers performed DoS attacks against PHP, Python and Ruby applications in 2011. As a response, PHP added an option in its ini con guration to set a limit on the number of collisions that are allowed to happen. However, in 2015, similar DoS attacks [1] were reported, abusing PHP's JSON parsing into hash tables. In this experiment we examine how S F performs when applied to this particular hash function implementation.
Our experimental setup is as follows: we ported the PHP hash table implementation so that the latter can be used in any C/C++ implementation, removing all the interpreter-speci c variables and macros, however leaving all the non interpreter-related components intact. Subsequently, we created a hash table with a size of 64 entries, and utilized S F to perform a maximum of 64 insertions to the hash table, using strings as keys, starting from a corpus consisting of a single input that causes 8 collisions. In particular, the keys for the hash table insertions were provided by S F at each generation and S F evolved its corpus of strings using a hybrid mutation strategy. Given a hash table of 64 entries and 64 insertions to the hash table, the maximum number of collisions that can be performed is also 64. In order to measure the number of collisions occurring in the hashtable at each generation, we created a PHP module (running in the context of PHP), and measured the number of collisions induced by each input that S F generates. We perform our measurements after the respective elements are inserted into a real PHP array. Our results are presented in Figure 8 .
We notice that despite the complex conditions required to trigger a hash collision and without knowing any details about the hash function, S F 's evolutionary engine reaches 31.25% of the theoretical worst-case after approximately 40 hours of fuzzing, using a single CPU. S F 's stateful, evolutionary guidance achieves monotonically increasing slowdowns, despite the complex constraints imposed by the hash function. On the contrary, repeating the same experiment using coverage-based fuzzing, yielded non-monotonically increasing collisions, and at no point an input was generated causing more than 8 collisions. In particular, fuzzing using coverage generated 58 inputs with a median of 5 collisions.
ZIP Utilities
Zip utilities that support various compression/decompression schemes are another instance of applications that have been shown to su er from Denial of Service attacks. For instance, an algorithmic complexity vulnerability used in the sorting algorithms in the bzip2 application 2 allowed remote attackers to cause DoS via increased CPU consumption, when they provided a le with many repeating inputs [16] .
In order to evaluate how S F performs when applied to the compression/decompression libraries, we apply it on bzip2 v1.0.6. In particular, we utilize S F to create compressed les of a maximum of 250 bytes, and we subsequently use the libbzip2 library to decompress them. Based on the slowdowns observed during decompression, S F evolves its input corpus, mutating each Decompression times for bzip files generated by SlowFuzz Figure 9 : Slowdowns observed while decompressing inputs generated by S F using the bzip2 binary. The maximum le size is set to 250 bytes.
A detailed case study. Figure 9 depicts the time required by the bzip2 binary to decompress each of the inputs generated by S F . We notice that for the rst hour of fuzzing, the inputs generated by S F do not exhibit signi cant slowdown during their decompression by bzip2. In particular, each of the 250-byte inputs of S F 's corpus for the rst hour of fuzzing is decompressed in approximately 0.0006 seconds. However, in upcoming generations, we observe that S F successfully achieves decompression times reaching 0.18s to 0.21s and an overall slowdown in the range of 300x. Particularly, in the rst 6 minutes after the rst hour, S F achieves a decompression time of 0.10 sec. This rst peak in the decompression time is achieved because of S F triggering the randomization mechanism of bzip2, by setting the respective header byte to a non-zero value. This mechanism, although deprecated, was put in place to protect against repetitive blocks, and is still supported for legacy reasons. However, even greater slowdowns are achieved when S F mutates two bytes used in bzip2's Move to Front Transform (MTF) [4] and particularly in the run length encoding of the MTF result. Speci cally, the mutation of these bytes a ects the total number of invocations of the BZ2_bzDecompress routine, which results in a total slowdown of 38.31x in decompression time.
The respective code snippet in which the a ected bytes are read is shown in Listing 2: the GET_MTF_VAL macro reads the modi ed bytes in memory 3 . These bytes subsequently cause the routine BZ2_bzDecompress to be called 4845 times, contrary to a single call before the mutation. We should note at this point, that the total size of the input before and after the mutation remained unchanged.
Finally, in order to compare with a non complexity-targeting strategy, we repeated the previous experiment using traditional coverage-based fuzzing. The fuzzer, when guided only based on coverage, did not generate any input causing executions larger than 0.0008 seconds, with the maximum slowdown achieved being 23.7%. Listing 2: Excerpt from bzip2's BZ2_decompress routine (decompress.c). A two byte modi cation by SlowFuzz results in a 38.31x slowdown compared to the previous input.
From the above experiment we observe that S F 's guidance and mutations engines are successful in pinpointing locations that trigger large slowdowns even in very complex applications such as a state-of-the-art compression utility like bzip2.
Result 2: S F is capable of exposing complexity vulnerabilities (e.g., 300x slowdown in bzip2, PCRE-compliant regular expressions with exponential matching time, and PHP hash table collisions) in real-world, non-trivial applications without knowing any domain-speci c details.
Engine Evaluation
E ect of S F 's tness function. In this section, we examine the e ect of using code-coverage-guided search versus S F 's resource usage based tness function, particularly in the context of scanning an application for complexity vulnerabilities. To do so, we repeat one of the experiments of Section 5.2, applying S F on the OpenBSD quicksort implementation with an input size of 64 bytes, for a total of 1 million generations, using hybrid mutations. Our results are presented in Figure 10 . We observe that S F 's guidance mechanism yields signi cant improvement over code-coverage-guided search. In particular, S F achieves a 3.3x slowdown for OpenBSD, whereas the respective slowdown achieved using only coverage-guided search is 23.41%. This is an expected result, since, as mentioned in previous Sections, code coverage cannot encapsulate behaviors resulting in multiple invocations of the same line of code (e.g., an in nite loop). Moreover, we notice that the total instructions of each unit that is created by S F at di erent generations is not monotonically increasing. This is an artifact of our implementation, using SanitizerCoverage's 8-bit counters, which provide a coarse-grained, imprecise tracking of the real number of times each edge was invoked (Section 4). Thus, although a unit might result in execution of fewer instructions, it will only be observed by S F 's guidance engine if the respective number of total CFG edges falls into a separate bucket (8 possible ranges representing the total number of CFG edge accesses). Future work can consider applying more precise instruction tracking (e.g., using hardware counters or utilities similar to perf) with static analyses passes, to achieve more e ective guidance.
Finally, when choosing the S F tness function, we also considered the option of utilizing time-based tracking instead of performance counters. However, performing time-based measurements in real-world systems is not trivial, especially at instructionlevel granularity and when multiple samples are required in order to minimize measurement errors. In the context of fuzzing, multiple runs of the same input will slow the fuzzer down signi cantly. To demonstrate this point, in Figure 10 , we also include an experiment in which the execution time of an input is used to guide input generation. In particular, we utilized CPU clock time to measure the execution time of a unit and discarded the unit if it was not slower than all previously seen units. We notice that the corpus degrades due to system noise and does not achieve any slowdown larger than 23%. E ect of Mutation Schemes. To highlight the di erent characteristics of each of S F 's mutation schemes described in Section 3, we repeat one of the experiments of Section 5.2, applying S F on the OpenBSD quicksort, each time using a di erent mutation strategy. Our experimental setup is identical with that of Section 5.2: we sort inputs with a size of 64 bytes and fuzz for a total of 1 million generations. For each mode of operation, we average on a total of 100 S F sessions. Our results are presented in Figure 11 . We notice that, for the above experiment, choosing a mutation at random, is the worst performing option among all mutation options supported by S F (Section 3.2), however still achieving a slowdown of 2.33x over the best performing input. Indeed, all of S F 's scoring-based mutation engines (o set-priority, mutation-priority and hybrid), are expected to perform at least as good as selecting mutations at random, given enough generations, as they avoid getting stuck with unproductive mutations. We also observe that o set priority is the fastest mode to converge out of the other mutation schemes for this particular experiment, and results in an overall slowdown of 3.27x.
For sorting, o sets that correspond to areas of the array that should not be mutated, are quickly penalized under the o set priority scheme, thus mutations are mainly performed on the non-sorted portions of the array. Additionally, we observe that mutation priority also outperforms the random scheme due to the fact that certain mutations (e.g., crossover operations) may have devastating e ects on the sorting of the array. The mutation priority scheme picks up such patterns and avoids such mutations. By contrast, these mutations continue to be used under the random scheme. Finally, we observe that the hybrid mode eventually outperforms all other strategies, achieving a 3.30x slowdown, however is the last mutation mode to start reaching a plateau. We suspect that this results from the fact the hybrid mode does not quickly penalize particular inputs or mutations as it needs more samples of each mutation operation and o set pair before avoiding any particular o set or mutation operation. Instrumentation overhead. S F 's runtime overhead, measured in executions per second, matches the overhead of native libFuzzer. The executions per second achieved on di erent payloads are mostly dominated by the runtimes of the native binary, as well as the respective I/O operations. Despite our choice to prototype S F using libFuzzer, the design and methodology presented in Section 3 can be applied to any evolutionary fuzzer and can also be implemented using Dynamic Binary Instrumentation frameworks, such as Intel's PIN [39] , to allow for more detailed runtime tracking of the application state. However, such frameworks are known to incur slowdowns of more than 200%, even with minimal instrumentation [43] . For instance, for our PHP hashtable experiments described in Section 5.4, an insertion of 16 strings, resulting in 8 collisions, takes 0.02 seconds. Running the same insertion under a PIN tool that only counts instructions, requires a total of~2 seconds. By contrast, hashtable fuzzing with S F achieves up to 4000 execs/sec, unless a signi cant slowdown is incurred due to a particular input. 5
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we demonstrated that evolutionary search techniques commonly used in fuzzing to nd memory safety bugs can be adapted to nd algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities. Similar strategies should be applicable for nding other types of DOS attacks like battery draining, lling up memory or hard disk, etc. Designing the tness functions and mutation schemes for detecting such bugs will be an interesting future research problem. Besides evolutionary techniques, using other mechanisms like reinforcement learning or Monte Carlo search techniques can also be adapted for nding inputs with worst-case resource usage.
Our current prototype of S F is completely dynamic. However, integrating static analysis techniques into S F can further improve its performance. Using static analysis to nd potentially promising o sets in an input for mutation will further reduce the search space and therefore will make the search process more efcient. For example, using taint tracking and loop analysis together with runtime ow pro les can identify potentially promising code locations that can cause signi cant slowdowns [41, 52] .
The current prototype implementation of S F uses the SanitizerCoverage passes to keep track of the number of times a CFG edge is accessed. Such tracking is limited by the total number of buckets allowed by SanitizerCoverage. This reduces the accuracy of resource usage information as tracked by S F . This results from the fact that any edge that is accessed more than 128 times is assigned to the same bucket regardless of the actual number of accesses. Although, under its current implementation, the actual edge count information is imprecise, this is not a fundamental design limitation of S F but an artifact of our prototype implementation. Alternative implementations can o er more precise tracking can via custom callbacks for SanitizerCoverage, by adopting hardware counters or by utilizing per-unit perf tracking. On the other hand, the bene t of the current implementation is that it can be incorporated into libFuzzer's main engine orthogonally, without requiring major changes to libFuzzer's dependencies. 5 Execution under S F does not require repeated loading of the required libraries, but is only dominated by the function being tested, which is only a fraction of the total execution of the native binary (thus smaller than 0.02 seconds). Finally, recent work by Holland et al.
RELATED WORK
[34] combines static and dynamic analysis to perform analyst-driven exploration of Java programs to detect complexity vulnerabilities. However, contrary to S F , this work requires a human analyst to closely guide the exploration process, specifying which portions of the binary should be analyzed statically and which dynamically as well as de ning the inputs to the binary. Performance bugs. Several prior works target generic performance bugs not necessarily related to complexity vulnerabilities. For instance, Lu et al. study a large set of real-world performance bugs to construct a set of rules that they use to discover new performance bugs via hand-built checkers integrated in the LLVM compiler infrastructure [36] . Along the same lines, LDoctor [52] detects loop ine ciencies by implementing a hybrid static-dynamic program analysis that leverages di erent loop-speci c rules. Both the above lines of work, contrary to S F , require expert-level knowledge for creating the detection rules, and are orthogonal to the current work. Another line of work focuses on application pro ling to detect performance bottlenecks. For example, Ramanathanet al. utilize ow pro ling for the e cient detection of memory-related performance bugs in Java programs [41] . Grechanik et al. utilize a genetic-algorithm-driven pro ler for detecting performance bottlenecks [48] in Web applications, and cluster execution traces to explore di erent combinations of the input parameter values. However, contrary to S F , their goal is to explore a large space of input combinations in the context of automatic application pro ling and not to detect complexity vulnerabilities. WCET. Another related line of work addresses accurate Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) estimation for a given application. Apart from static analysis and evolutionary testing approaches [26] , traditionally WCET estimation has been achieved using search based methods measuring end-to-end execution times [55] utilizes evolutionary-based, mutation-assisted testing to target semantic bugs. Although many of the aforementioned lines of research share many common building blocks with S F , they do not target complexity vulnerabilities and mainly utilize random mutations contrary to S F 's targeted mutation strategies.
CONCLUSION
In this work we designed S F , the rst, to the best of our knowledge, evolutionary-search-based framework targeting algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities. We evaluated S F on a variety of real-world applications including zip utilities, regular expression libraries and hash table implementations. We demonstrated that S F can successfully generate inputs that match the theoretical worst-case complexity in known algorithms. We also showed that S F was successful in triggering complexity vulnerabilities in all the applications we examined. S F 's evolutionary engine and mutation strategies generated inputs causing more than 300-times slowdown in the bzip2 decompression routine, produced inputs triggering high numbers of collisions in production-level hash table implementations, and also generated regular expressions with exponential matching complexities without any knowledge about the semantics of regular expressions. We believe our results demonstrate that customized evolutionary search techniques present a promising direction for automated detection of not only algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities, but also of other types of resource exhaustion vulnerabilities, and hope to aspire tighter integration of existing techniques and static analyses with modern mutation-based evolutionary testing.
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